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Abstract: the victory of las navas de tolosa was of 
profound significance to pope innocent iii. it came 
after a long period of intensive papal activity in spain. 
We can only understand innocent iii’s actions during 
the campaign by looking first of all at the actions of his 
predecessors over a long period of time. innocent built 
on a long tradition of aiming to secure peace between 
the christian kingdoms in the iberian peninsula, com-
bined with the reform of the church and the promo-
tion of the military and religious orders. But christian 
divisions and a lack of military success, either in spain 
or the Holy land, meant that the papacy was some-
times hesitant to commit itself to campaigns against 
the almohads.
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Resumen: la victoria de las navas de tolosa era de 
enorme importancia para el papa inocencio iii. se 
produjo después de un largo periodo de intensa acti-
vidad papal en españa. sólo podemos comprender las 
acciones de inocencio iii durante esa lucha armada si 
consideramos en primer lugar las acciones de sus pre-
decesores a lo largo de mucho tiempo. inocencio se 
basaba en una larga tradición de intentos de asegurar 
la paz entre los reinos cristianos en la península ibéri-
ca, junto con los esfuerzos en la reforma de la iglesia y 
la promoción de las órdenes militares y religiosas. pero 
las divisiones entre los cristianos y la falta de éxito mili-
tar, ya sea en españa o en tierra santa, significan que 
el papado se mostraba a veces indeciso para compro-
meterse en las luchas contra los almohades.
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the PAPACy And sPAin in the seCond hAlF oF the tWelFth Century
Although the pontificate of Innocent iii was significant in very many ways and left 
few corners of Western Europe untouched, politically or religiously, there can be no 
doubt that in the pope’s own mind the victory of the Christian forces at Las Navas 
de Tolosa was an event of the most profound importance, especially as it demons-
trated divine intervention against those who hated the cross of the Lord 1. Nobody 
can read Innocent iii’s response to Alfonso viii’s victory letter (which was very pos-
sibly penned by Archbishop Rodrigo) –with its exultancy in the power of the Lord 
to humble the arrogance of the strong and to subdue the conceit of the infidels– 
without appreciating how momentous the news of victory was for the pope and for 
the Roman curia 2. When hearing the news, Innocent called the clergy of the city 
and all the people of Rome to his presence, read the king’s letter to them, and then 
explained it to them personally, presumably in the vernacular 3. That was probably 
around mid-October 1212, since the pope’s congratulatory response to Alfonso was 
dated to 26 October. Likewise in October, in a minatory letter to the consuls and 
people of Milan, the pope advised them that crusading victories in Provence and by 
the army of the faithful in Spain –an army which had miraculously overcome innu-
merable Agarenes– demonstrated that no multitude of armies could resist the Lord 4. 
It is also fitting to mention here that the pope’s call to the Fourth Lateran Council 
came at a time when the papacy was exultant, following the Las Navas victory. In 
the crusading bull Quia Maior of April 1213, the call to the Fifth Crusade, the pope 
referred to the sign which the Lord had given that good was to come, that the end 
of the beast was approaching 5. It is highly probable that the sign which the pope 
referred to was Las Navas. The exultancy is explicable because, although Innocent 
did not wish to assign the victory to himself any more than he wished to attribute it 
 1 Demetrio mAnsillA (ed.), La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio iii (965-1216), (Monumenta His-
paniae Vaticana, 1), Rome, 1955 [hereafter mdi], no. 488, p. 521. Generally on the pontificate of In-
nocent iii, see John C. Moore, Pope Innocent iii (1160/1-1216): to root up and to plant, Notre Dame, 
2009.
 2 mdi, nos. 488, pp. 519-21; 483, pp. 510-15; Maurilio Pérez González, Sobre la edición de textos 
latinos medievales: la carta de Alfonso viii a Inocencio iii en 1212, in Veleia, 17 (2000), pp. 231-66, at pp. 
254-7.
 3 mdi, no. 488, pp. 520-1: ‘Convocantes ergo urbis clerum et populum universum, ei, qui facit mirabilia 
magna solus etsi non quantas debuimus, quantas tamen potuimus, una cum illis gratiarum exsolvimus 
actiones, ipsas tue celsitudinis litteras legi coram universa multitudine facientes, et ore proprio expo-
nentes easdem’.
 4 Jacques Paul miGne (ed.), Patrologiae latinae cursus completus, 221 vols, Paris, 1844-64 [hereafter PL], 
216:710-14.
 5 Pl, 216: 818: ‘Confidimus tamen in Domino, qui iam fecit nobiscum signum in bonum, quod finis 
huius bestiae appropinquat, cuius numerus secundum Apocalypsum Joannis intra sexcenta sexaginta 
clauditur, ex quibus iam pene sexcenti sunt completi’.
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to Alfonso (the Lord had done it all), it undoubtedly arrived as a success after a very 
long period of intense papal activity in the Iberian Peninsula 6.
It is impossible to understand Innocent’s interventions in various fields within 
Spain without consideration of the actions of his predecessors. As Demetrio Man-
silla recognized more than half a century ago now, the most important aspect of what 
might be called a papal ‘policy’ towards Spain in the second half of the twelfth century 
lay in the Roman curia gradually accepting the changed political circumstances of the 
peninsula after the death of Alfonso vii of León-Castile in 1157 7. The papacy moved 
from a position where it operated with a Castile which was overwhelmingly dominant, 
to one where Castile was still of primary importance but where other kingdoms had 
to be respected and encouraged in their battles against the Almohads. The first step 
here was taken by Pope Adrian iv in regularizing the existence of what later came to 
be known as the Crown of Aragon. It was only in June 1158, 24 years after the death of 
Alfonso i of Aragon, that a letter of Adrian to Ramon Berenguer iv conceded that the 
count of Barcelona and his heirs held the lands which Alfonso had bequeathed to the 
military orders (loosely defined) in his testament because those orders (the Templars, 
the Hospitallers and the Order of the Holy Sepulchre) in turn had conceded them to 
Ramon Berenguer 8. The count of Barceona’s primary role in military action against 
the Muslims undoubtedly helped the pope, who knew him personally, to look upon 
him sympathetically. The second step came in May 1179 when Alexander iii recog-
nized Afonso Henriques as king of Portugal, in the famous bull, Manifestis probatum 9. 
The move came almost forty years after Afonso had first claimed the royal title for 
himself and arrived precisely because the pope considered Afonso an intrepid extirpa-
tor of those who hate the Christian name and a diligent propagator of the Christian 
Faith. The third step came in 1196 when Pope Celestine iii recognized Sancho vii as 
king of Navarre. After the break-up of Aragon-Navarre in 1134, the papacy had only 
entitled García Ramírez and Sancho vi as dukes. Celestine’s decision came in response 
to the Christian defeat at Alarcos, in an attempt to extricate Sancho from an alliance 
with the Almohads, in order that he might arm himself to expel the perfidy of the Sara-
 6 mdi, no. 488, p. 521. 
 7 Demetrio mAnsillA, Inocencio iii y los reinos hispanos, in Anthologica Annua, 2 (1954), pp. 9-49.
 8 Paul kehr (ed.), Papsturkunden in Spanien. i Katalonien, Berlin, 1926 [hereafter Papsturkunden] no. 
81, pp. 364-5; Damian J. smith, The Abbot-Crusader: Nicholas Breakspear in Catalonia, in Brenda 
Bolton and Anne duGGAn (eds.), Adrian iv: the English Pope, Aldershot, 2003, pp. 29-39. 
 9 Pl, 200: 1237-8; Carl erdmAnn, O papado e Portugal no primeiro século da história Portuguesa, Coim-
bra, 1935; Peter FeiGe, Die Anfänge des portugiesischen Königtums und seiner Landeskirche, in Spanische 
Forschungen der Görres-Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, 29 (1978), pp. 
85-436; Antonio GArCíA y GArCíA, Reforma Gregoriana e idea de la «militia sancti Petri» en los reinos 
ibericos, in Studi Gregoriani, 13 (1989), pp. 241-62. José María soto ráBAnos, ¿Se puede hablar de 
un entramado político religioso en el proceso de independencia de Portugal?, in Hispania, 67 (2007), pp. 
795-826.
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cens 10. In all of these measures, Innocent iii’s predecessors had worked to strengthen 
the position of the Christian rulers, hoping that, secure in their own kingdoms, they 
would work together in peace to defeat the Almohads.
As the papacy worked to support those rulers who supported the Christian 
Faith, then it was equally ready to diminish kingdoms which did not do so. This 
was the case with León and it is important to remember that already by the time 
Innocent became pope, there was plenty of ‘history’ in relations between the papacy 
and the Leonese kings. Ferdinand ii of León had increasingly allied himself with the 
Almohads against the growing threats to his kingdom from Portugal and Castile and 
Alfonso ix, deeply embittered by his early humiliation at the hands of Alfonso viii 
of Castile, sided with al-Mansur after the Castilian defeat at Alarcos 11. We should 
remember that the response to this from Celestine iii was to launch what is now usu-
ally described as a ‘political crusade’. In October 1196, Celestine actually instructed 
the archbishops of Toledo and Compostela and their suffragans to encourage people 
to take up arms against Alfonso just as they would against the Saracens 12. Then, in 
April 1197, the pope went further, instructing Sancho i of Portugal that those who 
took up arms against Alfonso, while he remained allied to the Almohads, would be 
granted the same remission of sins as those who went to Jerusalem. Whatever, de-
clared the pope, Sancho or anybody else, took from Alfonso, either by fighting or 
in another way, was legally taken and need never revert to the domain of the king 13. 
Although the 1197 peace between Castile and León helped avoid this nightmare sce-
nario, it was undoubtedly the case that the papacy had little confidence in the good 
faith of Alfonso ix and this undoubtedly impacted on Innocent iii’s overall thinking 
concerning the Iberian Peninsula and made him especially cautious in dealing with 
its political affairs.
But it is also important to remember that caution had generally been the 
papacy’s watchword during the previous half-century where the Spanish crusades 
were concerned. It was the case that the flamboyant Cardinal Hyacinth (the later 
Celestine iii) had, at the councils of Valladolid and Lleida in 1155, not only assured 
the defenders of Christendom of the same remission of sins as those who went to 
Jerusalem, but at Vallladolid even placed the sign of the cross of Christ on his own 
breast and proposed himself to lead an army against those who hated the cross of 
10 Fidel FitA, Bulas inéditas, en Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, 27 (1895), pp. 229-30, no. 3.
11 ‘Chronica Latina Regum Castellae’, ed. Luis ChArlo BreA, in Chronica Hispana Saeculi xiii, ed. ChAr-
lo BreA, Juan estévez solA and Rocío CArAnde herrero, Turnhout, 1997, pp. 41-7; luCAs oF 
tuy, Chronicon Mundi, ed. Emma FAlque. Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis [hereaf-
ter CChr.CM] 74, Turnhout, 2003, pp. 316-9; Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, Historia de rebus Hispanie 
sive Historia Gothica, ed. Juan Fernández vAlverde, CChr.CM 72, Turnhout, 1977, pp. 241-253. 
12 Fidel FitA, Bulas históricas del reino de Navarra en los postreros años del siglo xii, in Boletín de la Real Aca-
demia de la Historia, 26 (1895), no. 3, pp. 423-4.
13 Carl erdmAnn (ed.), Papsturkunden in Portugal, Berlin, 1927, no. 154, pp. 376-7. 
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Christ 14. And in 1172, on his second legation to Spain, Hyacinth offered pardon 
of sins to those rallying against Abu Ya’qub Yusuf during the siege of Huete 15. But 
throughout the 1160s, with royal minorities in Castile and Aragon, the papacy did 
not push the crusade. It would only be in 1175, probably in response to Hyacinth, 
that Pope Alexander iii issued the bull Merore pariter, which, while it granted par-
don of sins to those who died fighting against the Massamuti and allowed those 
who fought against them for one year at their own expense the same remission 
for their confessed sins as those who visited the Holy Sepulchre, appears to in-
dicate that the papacy considered the crusade in Spain of slightly lesser spiritual 
value than that to the Holy Land 16. It should also be noted that the next crusad-
ing bull to Spain, Clement iii’s Cum pro peccatis, in May 1188, only came after the 
loss of Jerusalem, and alluded to the pope’s fear that just as that city had been lost 
through the sins of Christians, so Spain was under threat because of the discord 
between various Christian kings 17. Cardinal Hyacinth, as Pope Celestine iii, was 
again prominent in intensifying activity, expressing his bewilderment that Spanish 
rulers allied with the Ismaelites when all Christendom was uniting against them 18; 
sending, in 1192, his relative, Cardinal Gregory of Sant’Angelo, to procure peace 
among the Christians so that they might make war upon the Saracens 19; in 1193, 
instructing that the military orders and others should war against the Muslims 
even when the Christian kings had pacts with them 20; and on 10 July 1195, en-
couraging Alfonso viii in the action that he was about to undertake against the 
Saracens – an action which nine days later would result in the devastating defeat at 
Alarcos 21. The best therefore that Celestine could hope for when sending Gregory 
for a second time was for the pacification of the Christian kingdoms 22. This should 
14 mdi, no. 98, pp. 116-17; Fidel FitA, Concilios nacionales de Salamanca en 1154 y Valladolid en 1155, in 
Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, 24 (1894), pp. 467-75; Gener GonzAlvo i Bou (ed.), Les 
Constitucions de Pau i treva de Catalunya (segles xi-xiii), Barcelona, 1994, no. 12, p. 53; Ferran vAlls 
tABerner, ‘Ein Konzil zu Lerida im Jahre 1155’, in Papsttum und Kaisertum. Festschrift für Paul Kehr, 
ed. Albert BrACkmAnn, Munich, 1926, pp. 364-8.
15 Julio Porres mArtín-Cleto (ed.), Los Anales Toledanos i-ii, Toledo, 1993, pp. 144-5.
16 Fidel FitA, Tres bulas inéditas de Alejandro iii, in Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia, 12 (1888), pp. 
167-8. See Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades 1147-1254, Leiden, 2008, pp. 
62-5.
17 Juan Francisco riverA reCio, La Iglesia de Toledo en el siglo xii (1086-1208), Rome, 1966, pp. 222-3, 
n.74.
18 Juan Francisco riverA reCio, La Iglesia de Toledo, p. 228, n. 79. Also see smith, The Iberian legations 
of Cardinal Hyacinth Bobone, in John dorAn and Damian J. smith, Pope Celestine iii (1191-1198): 
Diplomat and Pastor, Farnham, 2008, pp. 81-111. 
19 Juan Francisco riverA reCio, La Iglesia de Toledo, pp. 229-30, n. 80.
20 Paul kehr (ed.), Papsturkunden in Spanien ii: Navarra und Aragon, Berlin, 1928, no. 200, pp. 554-5. 
21 Pietro zerBi, Papato, Impero e «respublica christiana» dal 1187 al 1198, Milan, 1980, no. 1, pp. 179-80.
22 Stefan Weiss, Die urkunden der päpstlichen legaten von Leo ix. bis Coelestin iii (1049-1198), Cologne, 
1995, pp. 300-305.
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then be noted. Except for Celestine, the previous popes had been generally slow 
and reluctant to grant crusading indulgences for the war in Spain. The defeat at 
Alarcos and its aftermath would not have suggested to Cardinal Lothar of Segni 
that subsequent attempts were likely to succeed.
While the papacy, during the second part of the twelfth century, had been some-
what reticent to grant crusading indulgences in the Iberian peninsula, conversely this 
same period saw a dramatic increase in the general level of papal government. While 
this increase was not always immediately related to the crusade, sometimes it was; 
and even when it was not, it still often had an impact upon crusading. Innocent iii 
became pope at a time when papal involvement in Iberian affairs had dramatically 
increased. Legates, and most obviously Cardinal Hyacinth, had undertaken legations 
which were more wide-ranging than ever before. Moreover, in councils over which 
the legates presided, victory over the infidel was connected to the internal purifica-
tion of Christendom. In 1155 and 1173, after offering the same indulgences which 
urban ii had granted to those setting out for Jerusalem, Hyacinth had set out in his 
constitutions a programme of moral reform, insisting on ending the abuses of clerical 
marriage and simony, but also emphasizing the proper conduct of the laity, whose du-
ties to pay tithes were insisted upon, as were the punishments for those who married 
within the prohibited degrees or who attacked the Church 23. Cardinal Gregory of 
Sant’Angelo also linked crusade and moral reform in the 1190s 24. The insistence on 
the sanctification of the Christian community in order to undertake military conflict 
would be especially emphasized in Innocent’s pontificate and was a major theological 
concern for the pope.
Part of the increase of papal government was a result of the ever-increasing use 
of the Roman curia as a court of first appeal or at times of first instance. This was 
especially the case in disputes between episcopal sees and between episcopal sees and 
religious orders in relation to rights over lands, possessions and peoples. Indeed, the 
papacy’s major strength lay in the fact that it was generally accepted that the pope 
had the right to judge in such cases. Many of these cases were of long-standing 
and extremely complicated, sometimes relating back to the ecclesiastical geography 
of the Iberian Peninsula pre-Islam. All of these disputes were a financial drain on 
the Church (and hence usually on the Crown) and some of them also contributed 
further to political divisions since they involved sees which were strongly identified 
with a particular Christian kingdom. The most important dispute concerned the 
primacy of Toledo, which was closely associated with the hegemony of the kingdom 
23 Gener GonzAlvo i Bou (ed.), Les Constitucions de Pau i treva de Catalunya, pp. 53-67.
24 Stefan Weiss, Die urkunden der päpstlichen legaten, pp. 300-5.
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of Castile 25. The dominance of Toledo over the other metropolitan sees was an indi-
cation of Castilian pre-eminence in the Peninsula. Although in the 1150s and 1160s 
the papacy appeared to be moving towards recognizing the independence at least 
of Compostela and probably Tarragona, ultimately the papacy upheld the terms of 
urban ii’s bull Cunctis sanctorum, recognizing primatial authority 26. The insistence 
of Toledo on this authority would both help and hinder the crusade of Las Navas. 
That is, Archbishop Rodrigo was undoubtedly energized in his support for the Las 
Navas campaign by a desire to glorify his own see. On the other hand, his insistence 
on trying to tie the primacy issue into the crusade left Innocent iii with a thorny 
problem with which to deal 27.
As the papacy, across the course of the twelfth century, increased its authority 
through its supreme appellate jurisdiction, so it did also through the privileges it 
conceded confirming the existence and the possessions of very many religious in-
stitutions. More and more monasteries and canonries placed themselves under the 
protection of the Apostolic See in return for various forms of exemption from local 
jurisdiction and small money payments. This was as much the case in the Iberian 
Peninsula as elsewhere and these privileges were very important in strengthening 
the position of religious communities in their local environment (if the privileges 
had not been useful, they would not have been asked for with such regularity!). Many 
of these communities played a significant part in consolidating Christendom or ex-
tending the Christian frontier, through their economic and spiritual endeavours, 
as well as through the population of vital areas. This was especially the case for the 
Cistercians and Premonstratensians, who became impressively powerful under papal 
protection 28. It was also crucially the case for the military orders which played such 
an immense part in the struggle against the Almohads. The Templars and the Hos-
pitallers were sustained by a vast array of papal privileges and advanced the Christian 
cause, especially in Aragon and Portugal 29. But most important of all was the papal 
25 Juan Francisco riverA reCio, La primacía eclesiástica de Toledo en el siglo xii, in Anthologica Annua, 10 
(1962), pp. 11-88.
26 mdi, nos. 91, pp.107-8; 100, pp. 118-19; 110, pp. 128-9.
27 mdi, no. 455, pp. 482-3.
28 Jean-Berthold mAhn, L’Ordre Cistercien et son gouvernement des origines au milieu du xiiie siècle (1098-
1265), Paris, 1951, pp. 119-69; Maur CoCheril, L’implantation des abbayes cisterciennes dans la penin-
sule ibérique, in Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 1 (1964), pp. 217-87; Luis Rafael villeGAs díAz, El 
Císter y la fundación de la Orden de Calatrava, in Cistercium, 57 (2005), pp. 165-95; Bonifacio PAlACios 
mArtín, El Císter y la fundación de la Orden de Alcántara, in Cistercium, 57 (2005), pp. 197-211; Nor-
bert BACkmund, Monasticon Praemonstratense, 3 vols, Straubing, 1949-56, 3, pp. 154-208; Eduardo 
CorrederA Gutiérrez, Los Condes soberanos de Urgel y los Premonstratenses, in Analecta Sacra Tarra-
conensia, 36 (1963), pp. 33-102, 209-82.
29 Many of these bulls are published in the Papsturkunden of erdmAnn and kehr, as well as in Rudolf 
hiestAnd (ed.), Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanitter, 2 vols, Göttingen, 1972-84; Joseph de-
lAville le roulx, Cartulaire générale de l’Ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jerusalem 1100-1300, 4 
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support for the new religious-military orders born in the Iberian Peninsula itself. 
All the major developments here took place during the pontificate of Alexander iii. 
In 1164, the pope confirmed the military and religious purpose of the brothers of 
Calatrava 30. In 1175, Alexander received the Santiagans under papal protection and 
insisted that they must themselves protect Christians from Saracen invasion, as well 
as spreading the Christian faith 31. The following year, the pope placed the commu-
nity of San Julián del Periero under papal protection 32. Eight years later, Lucius iii 
would exempt them from episcopal control and encourage them in the defense of 
Christianitas 33. All these orders- Caltatrava, Santiago, Alcántara (as it would become) 
– were, of course, to be of immense importance and Innocent iii’s continuation of 
the policy of his predecessors in supporting them was to be highly significant.
innoCent iii And sPAin BeFore the lAs nAvAs CAmPAiGn
Innocent iii must then be seen in the light of the actions of his predecessors and 
their attention to peace and the reform and renewal of the Church. But Innocent 
did also place his personal stamp on papal relations with the Iberian Peninsula. This 
was most obviously the case in the field of marriage and the making and breaking of 
political marriages had a major impact on the war against the Moors. As a cardinal, 
Innocent had written a treatise, De quadripartita specie nuptiarum, in which he had 
outlined his matrimonial theology 34. As Vicar of Christ his concern was with the uni-
ty of the Church and the matrimonial theology of the Church did not allow him to 
understand the marriage union in any narrow sense. Innocent’s deep consciousness 
of the range of matrimonial relationships (between Christ and the Church, God and 
the just soul, the Word and human nature, man and woman) made him absolutely 
determined that the marriage of a man and a woman should mirror and complement 
vols, Paris, 1894-1906; Josep Maria mArtí Bonet, Privilegios papales del archivo diocesano de Barcelona 
(Celestino ii a Celestino iii, a. 1144 al 1196), in Anthologica Annua, 27 (1980), pp. 779-820.
30 Ignacio José orteGA y Cotes, Juan Francisco álvArez de BAquedAno and Pedro de orteGA 
zúñiGA y ArAndA (eds.), Bullarium Ordinis Militiae de Calatrava, Madrid, 1761, p. 2.
31 PL, cc. 1024-30; Santiago domínGuez sánChez, Documentos pontificios referentes a la diócesis de León 
(siglos xi-xiii), universidad de León, 2003, no. 43, pp. 103-7; José Luis mArtín rodríGuez, Los 
orígenes de la Orden Militar de Santiago (1170-1195), Barcelona, 1974, no. 73, pp. 248-54; Eutimio 
sAstre sAntos, La Orden de Santiago y su regla, 2 vols, Madrid, 1982, ii., pp. 3-4.
32 Bonifacio PAlACios mArtín (ed.), Colección Diplomática Medieval de la Orden de Alcántara (1157?-
1494). I: De los orígenes a 1454, Madrid, 2000, no. 13, pp. 6-8.
33 Colección Diplomática... Alcántara, no. 16, pp. 10-13; Joseph o’CAllAGhAn, The foundation of the Order 
of Alcántara, in Catholic Historical Review, 47 (1962), pp. 471-86, at pp.478-9.
34 Pl, 217: 921-68. Wilhelm imkAmP, Das Kichenbild Innocenz’ iii. (1198-1216), Stuttgart, 1983; Isabelle 
enGAmmAre, Il trattato «De Quadrirpartita Specie nuptiarum» e la parentela spirituale del Cristo con la 
Chiesa, in Andrea sommerleChner (ed.), Innocenzo iii. Urbs et Orbis, 2 vols, Rome, 2003, 1, pp. 340-51. 
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the strength of the other bridal relationships 35. The marriage of Alfonso ix of León 
and Berenguela of Castile in October 1197, for the royal houses of Castile and León 
and for most of the churchmen in those kingdoms an entirely reasonable strategy 
whereby the two kingdoms would be at peace and hence could war upon the infidel, 
was wholly unacceptable to the pope because peace could not be obtained through 
sin and war could not be won by those who were sinful. In Innocent’s eyes, the ma-
rriage was incestuous and as such was abominable in the sight of the Lord and de-
testable in the judgement of the faithful 36. When Innocent sent his legate Rainier to 
Spain in order to secure peace between the kingdoms and dissolve iniquitous unions, 
he was just as sure that peace could not exist while iniquitous unions existed, as 
most of the prelates of Spain were sure that there would be no peace without such a 
union 37. Many of the prelates no doubt genuinely believed that the pope’s measures, 
and especially the interdict imposed upon León, would lead to a weakening of the 
Christian Faith 38. Writing some years after, Archbishop Rodrigo, considered that 
Innocent’s decision had caused war and devastation 39. But Innocent felt very strongly 
that the Church in Spain, by supporting such an incestuous union, was repeating the 
very error which had led to loss in the Holy Land, especially through the marria-
ge of Isabelle of Jerusalem, first to Conrad of Montserrat and then later to Count 
Henry of Champagne. The Christian people were scandalized, Innocent wrote to 
Archbishop Peter of Compostela, that now the sins that had led to such disasters and 
persecutions in the East were being transferred to the West 40.
Although Innocent was frustrated during a number of years by the continua-
tion of the marriage (a situation for which, from the reports he received, he actually 
considered Alfonso viii of Castile primarily to blame), it should be remembered that 
it was the pope’s consistent opposition which ultimately led to the separation of Al-
fonso ix and Berenguela (by then, of course with four children, including the future 
Ferdinand iii), a separation which caused further conflict over Berenguela’s dowry 41. 
Equally, in another marriage case, the pope’s influence had been decisive, in that he 
had insisted on the invalidity of the marriage of King Peter ii of Aragon to a sister 
35 mdi, no. 497, p. 535; Wilhelm imkAmP, Das Kichenbild Innocenz’ iii, p. 224.
36 Die Register Innocenz’iii., 9 volumes to date, ed. Othmar hAGeneder, Anton hAidACher, Alfred 
strnAd, Werner mAleCzek, Karl rudolF, Andrea sommerleChner, John moore, Christoph 
eGGer, Rainer murAuer, Reinhard selinGer, and herWiG WeiGl, Vienna, 1964-2010 [hereafter 
Register], 1, no. 92, pp. 132-4; mdi, no. 138, p. 169.
37 Register 1, no. 92, p. 133; mdi, no. 138, p. 168.
38 Register 2, no. 72, pp. 126-34; mdi, no. 196, p. 210.
39 Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, Historia de rebus Hispanie, Bk. vii, c. 24, p. 247
40 Register 2, no. 72, pp. 127-8; mdi, no. 196, p. 210. See also Joseph o’CAllAGhAn, Innocent iii and the 
Kingdoms of Castile and Leon, in John moore (ed.), Pope Innocent iii and his World, Aldershot, 1999, pp. 
319-25.
41 Register 7, nos. 93-4, pp. 146-50; mdi, nos. 304-5, pp. 335-9.
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of Sancho vii of Navarre. Though we have no commentary on the matter from the 
Iberian Peninsula, that decision too might well have been seen as detrimental to the 
prosecution of the war against the Almohads. Sancho vii of Navarre had been enti-
tled king by Celestine iii in 1196, in an attempt to draw him away from his alliance 
with the Muslims against Castile 42. But it is not clear that Sancho broke that alliance, 
and in 1198 both Alfonso viii and Peter ii invaded Navarre 43. Peter agreed a secret 
truce with Sancho, provided one of his sisters became Sancho’s wife. Alfonso viii, 
informed of the accord, insisted Sancho swore to the truce before his own departure 
from Navarrese lands. Sancho swore to the truces and the marriage, even though his 
sister was related to Peter in the third degree of consanguinity. In this matter, In-
nocent intervened on the question of an oath illicitly sworn. As Sancho’s oath was a 
bond of iniquity and faith in evil promises should be completely repealed, Innocent 
strictly forbade him from fulfilling the terms of the oath lest an incestuous mar-
riage resulted from it 44. Sancho, protected by Innocent, as he had been by Celestine, 
rendered himself indefensible when he fled to the lands of al-Nasir before renewed 
Castilian attacks 45. But here again the pope had made a decision in order to avoid 
iniquity, although the incorporation of Navarre into Castile and Aragon would have, 
on the face of it, militarily strengthened Christian Spain.
These early problems concerning marriage and oaths, undoubtedly shaped In-
nocent’s view of the peninsula’s problems, but amidst these difficulties Peter ii of 
Aragon, although, even setting aside the Navarrese expedition, he had been involved 
in various contentions over his father’s will and his mother’s castles, and had been 
forced by Innocent’s intervention to withdraw from circulation coinage of fraudulent 
weight, nevertheless developed his image as a champion of the papacy and an eager 
crusading king 46. This was most obviously done through his coronation at Rome on 
11 November 1204, an event very possibly without precedent 47. At San Pancrazio, 
King Peter was anointed by Peter, cardinal-bishop of Porto and afterwards crowned 
by Innocent himself. Innocent bestowed upon the king all the royal insignia (the 
42 Fidel FitA, Bulas inéditas, pp. 229-30, no. 3.
43 Cardinal Gregory appears to have excommunicated Sancho and placed his kingdom under interdict 
for attacking Alfonso viii’s castles and Brother Rainier was charged to investigate whether Sancho 
continued to ally with Saracens against Christians (mdi, no. 138p. 169.); Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, 
Historia de rebvs Hispanie, Bk. vii, ch. 30, p. 254; Lucas of Tuy, Chronicon Mundi, Bk. 4, ch. 83, p. 322; 
‘Chronica Latina Regum Castellae’, chs. 14, p. 48; 16, p. 50. 
44 Register 1, no. 553, pp. 801-2; mdi, no. 181, pp. 197-8.
45 Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, Historia de rebvs Hispanie, Bk. vii, ch. 30, p. 254; Roger of Howden, Chron-
ica, ed. William stuBBs, 4 vols, London, 1868-71, iii., pp. 91-2, iv., 78-9.
46 Register 2, no. 28; mdi, no. 183, pp. 199-200; Damian J. smith, Innocent iii and the Crown of 
Aragon: the limits of Papal Authority, Aldershot, 2004, nos. 1, 3, pp. 264-5; Thomas Bisson, Quanto 
personam tuam (X 2.24.18): its original significance, in Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of 
Medieval Canon Law, ed. Stephan kuttner, Toronto, 1976, pp. 239-40.
47 Register 7, no. 229, pp. 406-9; mdi, no. 337, pp. 339-41. 
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mantle and tabard; the sceptre and orb, the crown and mitre) and in return Peter 
swore to be obedient to Innocent, his Catholic successors and the Roman Church, 
to defend the Catholic Faith and to persecute heretical wickedness. He also swore to 
guard the liberty and immunity of the Church and to serve justice and peace in all 
his lands. At the basilica of Saint Peter, the king offered his kingdom to Saint Peter 
and made himself a tributary, offering an annual census of 250 mazmudins in return 
for papal protection for himself and his successors and his kingdom 48. The motives 
of the king in performing this act were undoubtedly complicated. They related to 
his own prestige and that of his dynasty within his realms, the protection of his 
holdings in Languedoc and Provence, the projected marriage of his sister to King 
Frederick of Sicily (the Emperor Frederick ii) and a projected campaign against the 
Muslims of Majorca 49. For Innocent, who followed his predecessors in being gener-
ally sympathetic to the kings of Aragon, the coronation had the additional benefits 
of providing him with a propaganda coup both before the ever troublesome Ro-
man people, and in the imperial election dispute, since Philip of Swabia had been 
crowned in the wrong place and by the wrong person. Generally, the coronation of 
Peter demonstrated Innocent’s conception of how the world should be governed, 
with the secular power being the obedient arm of the Church in the defense of the 
faith, willing executor of justice and promoter of peace 50.
While Innocent was certainly impressed with Peter ii’s resolve to attack the 
infidel (and in June 1205 agreed to the establishment of an episcopal see in Ma-
jorca, if God would give the island into Peter’s hands) 51, the pope was clearly re-
luctant to make a full commitment to the war against the Moors at this time. In 
February 1204, Innocent had already argued to Peter that while he delighted in 
the king’s enthusiasm to attack those who ‘wished to wipe the memory of the name 
of Christian from the earth’, the other Christian kings of the Peninsula were still 
opposed to one another and that made an attack against the king of Morocco, now 
doubly powerful after the taking of Majorca from the Almoravids, inadvisable 52, 
By August 1204 and with an improvement at least in relations between León and 
Castile, the pope was more enthusiastic about the projected campaign to be under-
taken with the help of Genoa or Pisa, but he still advised Peter to travel to Rome 
first and Genoa afterwards, and appeared more interested in the marriage of his 
48 Ibid.
49 Bonifacio PAlACios mArtín, La Coronación de los reyes de Aragón 1204-1410: aportación al estudio de las 
estructuras medievales, Valencia, 1975; idem, La bula de Inocencio iii y la coronación de los reyes de Aragón, 
in Hispania, 29 (1969), pp. 485-504.
50 Damian J. smith, Innocent iii and the Crown of Aragon, pp. 43-78; idem, Motivo y significado de la coro-
nación del rey Pedro ii de Aragón, in Hispania, 60 (2000), pp. 163-79.
51 Register 8, no. 94, p. 173; mdi, no. 318, p. 349.
52 Register 6, no. 234, pp. 395-6; mdi, no. 295, pp. 329-30.
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ward Frederick than anything else 53. Innocent’s caution is comprehensible. The 
Almohads appeared to be advancing and strengthening. There was no guarantee 
that peace would last between Castile and León (and, indeed, it did not) 54, and, 
besides this, neither Castile nor Aragon were at peace with Navarre. Moreover, re-
lations between Castile and Portugal were somewhat strained, and while Innocent 
had in his first year had the pleasure of receiving the payment of the Portuguese 
census, those payments remained irregular, as did the behaviour of Sancho i 55.
Reluctant in the crusade, the Pope remained fully enthusiastic in his support 
for ecclesiastical reform. Innocent did not only wish to build up the Church in 
Spain metaphorically but quite literally. Indeed, it seems likely that when Inno-
cent sent his faithful servant Rainier into the Iberian Peninsula in 1198, he was as 
much concerned with the repair of the physical state of the churches, which the 
legate crossed on his path, as with their moral state 56. The two, of course, were not 
disconnected, and in 1205, the pope would be concerned with both the financial 
and moral damage caused by attacks which the seemingly ungrateful Peter ii had 
made on the diocese of Elne, because the bishop had been elected without his 
consent 57. Similarly, in that same year, report reached Innocent from the bishop of 
Burgos of various abuses against ecclesiastical liberty committed by Alfonso viii, 
who, in the eyes of the pope, appeared to extol the mosque and the synagogue 
while undermining ecclesiastical liberty 58. Criticism and threats appear to have 
made far more impression on the king of Aragon than on the king of Castile, and 
with a statute which Innocent confirmed on 30 October 1207, Peter ii revoked the 
53 Johannes Fried, Der päpstliche Schutz für Laienfürsten: Die politische Geschichte des päpstlichen Schutzpri-
vilegs für Laien (11.-13.Jh.), Heidelberg, 1980, p. 329.
54 After Alfonso ix and Berenguela had been absolved and separated, their excommunications were lifted 
(Register 7, no. 68, pp. 105-6; mdi, nos. 299, p. 332; 304, pp. 335-6.) but the pope required Beren-
guela to give up the castles which she had from Alfonso as a dowry (Register 7, no. 93, pp. 146-9; mdi, 
no. 305, pp. 336-9). This led to new disputes between León and Castile (‘Chronica Latina’, ch. 17, 
p. 52). In March 1206, Innocent entrusted leading Spanish prelates the task of settling these disputes 
(Register 9, no. 2, pp. 10-11; mdi, no. 331, p. 358), although the kings had in fact done so at the treaty 
of Cabreros of 26 March 1206, before the pope’s letter arrived (Julio González, El reino de Castilla 
en la época de Alfonso viii, 3 vols, Madrid, 1960, i., pp. 738-40; ii., 365-74, no. 782; idem, Alfonso ix, 2 
vols, Madrid, 1944, i., pp. 121-3; ii., 284-91, no. 205).
55 The kingdom was a census-paying protectorate. Sancho i cleared the arrears in part in 1198 (mdi, p. 
193, no. 170) but does not appear to have paid again. Afonso ii paid off most of the debt in 1213 (An-
tonino PoiAres, Uma carta de frei Gonçalo Hispano núncio do Papa Inocěncio iii, in Gaceta Numismatica, 
170 (2008), 17-22), though not to the entire satisfaction of Honorius iii (Antonio Joaquim diAs dinis 
(ed.), Monumenta Henricina, 15 vols [Lisbon 1960-74], 1, no. 27, pp. 50-1). Now on the early kings of 
Portugal, see Maria Alegria FernAndes mArques, A corte dos primeiros reis de Portugal: Afonso Henri-
ques, Sancho i, Afonso ii, Somonte-Cenero, 2009.
56 Register, 1, no. 395, p. 594; mdi, no. 166, pp. 189-90.
57 Register, 8, no. 9, pp. 22-3; mdi, no. 311, pp. 342-4.
58 Register, 8, no. 50, pp. 86-7; mdi, no. 312, pp. 344-5.
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pessima consuetudo whereby the election of prelates without the advice or assent of 
the king had been forbidden 59. Peter may not really have been giving away all that 
much, but the concession was important for a pope who had probably witnessed 
the canonization of Becket at Segni in 1173 and definitely visited his tomb at Can-
terbury a few year later. Innocent appeared to be winning his long-term battle for 
the freedom of the church 60.
Innocent also sought to further the standing of the Roman Church by judging 
ecclesiastical disputes to an unprecedented extent. While it is true that the pope was 
sometimes frustrated both by the number and type of cases coming to Rome, he 
sought to make the best decisions possible to resolve complex disputes. There were 
many such disputes between churches in Spain, but the two which occupied most 
time during Innocent’s pontificate were those between Braga and Compostela over 
various sees, and between Huesca and Lleida over a great many churches. Both dis-
putes were conditioned by the war against the Moors. When Compostela rose to the 
status of the metropolitan see in the early twelfth century it incorporated the sees of 
the ancient province of Mérida 61. This meant sees within the kingdom of Portugal 
were under the jurisdiction of Compostela, while the metropolitan see of Braga 
held jurisdiction over some sees outside of Portugal. In 1199, Innocent and his law-
yers sought to resolve the problem with Solomonic wisdom by placing Lamego and 
Idanha under the jurisdiction of Compostela, while Coimbra and Viseu fell to Braga. 
Though this did not resolve the dispute altogether (and a further dispute concern-
ing zamora was not settled) it quieted the conflict 62. This was similarly the case with 
Huesca and Lleida. To unravel all the strands of that tangled affair is not possible 
here. But both Huesca and Lleida claimed jurisdiction over various churches on the 
basis of royal and papal privileges, some of which had been granted to their replace-
ment sees before their recapture (in 1094 and 1149 respectively). The authenticity 
of some of those privileges was hotly disputed. In 1203, Innocent and his lawyers 
settled the case with a division of rights of almost bewildering complexity, which 
again calmed the contending parties 63. As in times past, while the disputes were not 
59 Register 10, no. 144, pp. 248-9; mdi, no. 373, pp. 394-5; Johannes vinCke, Staat und Kirche in Kata-
lonien und Aragon während des Mittelalters, Munster, 1931, p. 261.
60 On Innocent’s early life, see Michele mACCArrone, Innocenzo iii prima del pontificato, in Archivio della 
Società Romana di Storia Patria, 66 (1943), pp. 59-134; John moore, Lotario de Conti di Segni (Pope 
Innocent iii) in the 1180s, in Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 29 (1991), pp. 255-8.
61 Antonio GArCíA y GArCíA, Alejandro iii y los reinos ibéricos, in Miscellanea Rolando Bandinelli Papa Ales-
sandro iii, ed. Filippo liottA, Siena, 1986, pp. 237-57, at 245-6.
62 Register 2, nos. 95, 97-8, pp. 201-7, 209-16; mdi, nos. 198-200, pp. 215-227; Demetrio mAnsillA, 
Disputas diocesanos entre Toledo, Braga y Compostela en los siglos xii al xv’, in Anthologica Annua, 3 (1955), 
pp. 89-144.
63 Register 6, no. 75, pp. 104-16; mdi, no. 271, pp. 292-300; Eladio Gros BítriA, Los límites diocesanas 
en el Aragón oriental, zaragoza, 1980.
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directly related to the prosecution of crusade, their closure or near closure did free 
up a little money which had previously been wasted in legal expenses.
However, the privileges granted by the pope to the military orders aided the 
war against the Muslims more visibly and more substantially. Of particular relevance 
here are the confirmations by the pope of the rule and possessions of the order of 
Alcántara in letters of 1199, 1205, 1207, and 1214 64. The Santiagans, while gain-
ing confirmation of their privileges in 1205 and 1210, had their opportunities to 
remarry limited by Innocent in a letter of 1208 at the request of the Master himself, 
so as not to disturb the communal life 65. The Calatravans received confirmation of 
their rule from Innocent, the protection of their property, and the renewal of their 
exemptions 66. In an especially significant letter of 16 June 1205, Innocent responded 
to complaints made by Peter ii of Aragon that the brothers of Calatrava and Vélez 
did not dare to fight against the Saracens while Alfonso viii of Castile had truces 
with them. Peter asked that the Calatravans should come to fight on his frontier and 
Innocent ordered them to do so if they thought it was fitting 67. We should also re-
member that the Templars and the Hospitallers were very active in Spain, especially 
in the lands of the Crown of Aragon, and that the pope confirmed many of their 
privileges on many occasions 68. All of these actions significantly helped in strength-
ening the position of forces which would play a substantial part in the Christian 
victory a few years later. It is also appropriate here to mention the special support 
that Innocent gave to the Trinitarian order for the ransoming of captives from the 
Moors. They were especially active in Spain and he was especially active in support 
of them. In a letter of 8 March 1199, which would have been received by al-Nāsir, 
Innocent commended the Trinitarians to him, explaining that the redemption of 
captives was especially commended to the faithful by Christ, and expressing his wish 
that al-Nāsir and his subjects would soon hasten towards the Truth that is Christ 69.
innoCent iii And the lAs nAvAs CAmPAiGn
The ‘policies’ which Innocent and his predecessors had developed of seeking the 
reform of the Church and peace between the different kingdoms, that is to say, their 
64 Colección Diplomática... Alcántara, no. 38, p. 22; no.47, p.25; no. 48, pp. 25-6; no. 55, p. 28.
65 Register 11, no. 135, pp. 212-13; mdi, no. 324, p. 353; no. 390, pp. 404-5; no. 423, pp. 442-8.
66 Francisco de uhAGón, Índice de los documentos de la Orden Militar de Calatrava, in Boletín de la Real 
Academia de la Historia, 35 (1899), pp. 67-9.
67 Register 8, no. 97, pp. 175-6; mdi, no. 321, p. 351.
68 Damian J. smith, Innocent iii and the Crown of Aragon, pp. 241-2.
69 Register 2, no. 9, pp. 16-17; mdi, no. 182, p. 198. See James M. PoWell, Innocent iii, the Trinitarians, 
and the Renewal of the Church. 1198-1200, in Giulio CiPollone (ed.), La liberazione dei ‘captivi’ tra 
Cristianità, Vatican City, 2000, pp. 245-54.
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general intent on the spiritual purification of Christendom- were carried forward 
into the Las Navas campaign. Having gained the submission of Ifrīquiya in 1205-
6, al-Nāsir had called on his Andalusian governors to prepare for a renewal of war 
against the Christians of the peninsula, and while that projected campaign was abor-
ted and some of his chief advisors were against a renewed attack, believing the Chris-
tian position to have strengthened since Alarcos, it is most probable that their was a 
general desire for war on the Almohad side, just as their was on the Aragonese side 
in particular 70. From 1209, Aragon was at peace with the entire Christian Peninsula 
and ready for action. Castilian-Almohad truces extended to 1210 but it appears that 
Peter ii was already prepared for action in 1208 71. In the winter of 1209-10, Peter 
sent ambassadors to Innocent urging him to persuade Alfonso viii to join with him 
in the battle against al-Nāsir or at least not to impede his subjects from doing so 72. At 
the time Peter’s ambassadors arrived with this request, the situation for Innocent was 
somewhat complicated. The Albigensian crusade against the heretics in the south 
of France had been initiated and Innocent was very much hoping that Alfonso viii 
and Peter ii would support that campaign, especially by capturing heretics in flight 
from the action led by Simon de Montfort. In the bull Licet ad promovendum, on 11 
November 1209, Innocent had expressed to both kings his belief that they would 
be able more easily to destroy the invading pagans if they had Catholic neighbours 
in the north 73. But Innocent’s concern for Spanish support against heretics did not 
ultimately outweigh his desire to see the war against the Muslims. When Peter made 
his request, Innocent, as so often, linked in his mind the struggle in Spain and the 
struggle in the Holy Land. In a letter dated 16 February 1210, Exemplo miserabilis, 
Innocent responded to Peter’s petition by writing to Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo 
and his suffragans, urging that the trickery of the pagans that had led to losses in the 
Holy Land should not be repeated in Spain 74. Telling Rodrigo that Peter ii, burning 
with orthodox zeal, prepared to fight against the perfidy of the Saracens, Innocent 
asked Rodrigo to persuade Alfonso viii to emulate Peter’s example but if he could 
not be persuaded to do so, then he should at least not impede his subjects from 
doing so. Those subjects would receive a remission of sins in promoting ‘tantum 
Dei servitium’.
70 For the military and political background to the crusade, see Francisco GArCíA Fitz, Las Navas de 
Tolosa, Barcelona, 2005; Antonio huiCi mirAndA, Las grandes batallas de la Reconquista durante las 
invasiones africanas, Madrid, 1956, pp. 219-327; Martín AlvirA CABrer, Guerra e ideología en la España 
Medieval: cultura y actitudes históricas ante el giro de principios del siglo xiii. Batallas de Las Navas de Tolosa 
(1212) y Muret (1213), Tesis Doctoral, universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2000, pp. 179-227.
71 Damian J. smith, Innocent iii and the Crown of Aragon, pp. 82-3, 90.
72 mdi, no. 416, p. 436.
73 mdi, no. 411, pp. 430-1. Most recently on Innocent’s actions within the Albigensian Crusade, see 
Marco mesChini, Innocenzo iii e il negotium pacis et fidei in linguadoca tra il 1198 e il 1215, Rome, 2007.
74 mdi, no. 416, p. 436
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Innocent’s letter, following that to the Calatravans four years before, appears 
a very deliberate attempt to goad the Castilian king into action, by contrasting his 
apathy with the enthusiasm of the young king of Aragon. The suggestion that not 
only the military orders but others among his subjects should campaign with Peter 
ii, while he sat idly by, could not but have hurt the man who had been so cruelly hu-
miliated at Alarcos. As his truces with the Almohads were coming to an end, Alfonso 
viii sought to renew hostilities at Segura and Jaén, just as Peter ii in league with the 
Templars, conducted an important campaign in the kingdom of Valencia 75. As Peter 
ii set himself up as the Christian champion, it fell to Alfonso viii’s eldest son, Prince 
Ferdinand, to do the same and in late 1210 Ferdinand sent messengers to Innocent 
to indicate to the pope his desire to exterminate the enemies of the Christian name. 
In response, with Significavit nobis, of 10 December 1210, Innocent, as well as em-
phasizing that the Almohads impiously occupied the lands which they held in Spain, 
again took up what was for him the vital theme of Christian unity 76. The pope de-
lighted that Ferdinand desired to dedicate the first fruits of his military life to God. 
He commended his plan and ordered the archbishops and bishops throughout Spain 
to persuade kings and princes who were not strictly bound by truces with the Sara-
cens to aid Ferdinand in his venture, both with money and people, for which they 
would receive remission for all their sins, as would those pilgrims who proceeded out 
of devotion from whatever country. This was a significant moment in the campaign 
which would lead to Las Navas, as the pope now envisioned the forthcoming strug-
gle as ideally involving all the Christian rulers and Christian forces from outside 
Spain.
It is probable that Innocent, perhaps due to reports received from Ferdinand’s 
messengers, perhaps from the bishop of Palencia, was expecting that the kings of 
León and Portugal would not support the enterprise. A version of Significavit nobis 
was also sent to the archbishop of Toledo and the bishops of Coimbra, zamora, and 
Tarazona, dated 22 February 1211, in which the pope ordered them that if, while 
Alfonso viii and Ferdinand were fighting against the Saracens, any king of Spain 
violated truces which they held with them, they were to be subject to ecclesiastical 
punishment 77. The information that there was likely to be Christian disunity and 
conflict if a campaign was undertaken may very well explain Innocent’s reaction 
to the request which Alfonso viii made to him, through Bishop Tello of Palencia, 
for a legate to be sent to Spain. Innocent, in Cum personam tuam, also of 22 Febru-
ary 1211, denied the request because of the unpeacefulness of the times 78. It is, of 
75 Miguel GuAl CAmArenA, Precedentes de la Reconquista valenciana, Valencia, 1952, pp. 208-12; Martín 
AlvirA CABrer, Guerra e ideología, p. 176.
76 mdi, no. 442, pp. 472-3.
77 mdi, no. 446, pp. 474-5.
78 mdi, no. 447, pp. 475-6.
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course, not clear whether the pope was referring to the lack of peace in Spain or to 
the many troubles which he faced both elsewhere in Christendom and in the Holy 
Land. It may well have been a combination of the two. It may well also have been 
the case that while Alfonso viii looked back to the legations of Cardinals Hyacinth 
and Gregory, as well as brother Rainier, and believed in the abilities of the legates to 
procure some measure of peace, Innocent did not feel that he had anybody readily 
available who was likely to achieve that objective and that it was better to leave the 
matter in the hands of the prelates already in the peninsula, which is, of course, what 
he did. It should be emphasized that Cum personam tuam was generally positive. The 
pope praised Alfonso viii personally. He also offered to satisfy the king’s petition at 
a more opportune time. Moreover, he did aim to procure peace through the Spanish 
bishops 79.
Innocent next concerned himself (and not for the first time) with the financial 
problems of Peter ii. The king of Aragon faced severe difficulties both because of 
problems and commitments he had inherited from his father and his own profligacy. 
His ambitions often outweighed his means 80. Though Peter was extremely enthu-
siastic for war against the Almohads, he did not have the wherewithal to pay for his 
army. In the first part of 1211 he asked the pope that, since he now had to expend 
a great amount in order to fight against those who hate the Christian name, he be 
allowed to revoke certain donations which he had made before he had reached his 
majority, since he had given away a major part of his revenue in this way. Innocent 
conceded that Peter should be allowed to revoke all donations which he had made 
illegally at that time, but with the proviso that any donations which had been made 
to churches or to other pious places, if they were to be revoked, should be revoked 
according to an ecclesiastical judgement 81. It is difficult at the moment to know how 
significant this letter, Cum donationes of 12 April 1211, would prove to the success of 
the Las Navas campaign. We know that Peter was in part to be financed by Alfonso 
viii of Castile. But did Cum donationes allow Peter to recover sufficient money and 
goods that it significantly helped him to make the journey to Castile in the first 
place?
By the early summer the pope was faced with another difficult problem since 
Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo, who was playing such an immense part in the or-
ganization of the crusade, decided to take the opportunity to seek a renewed confir-
mation of the Toledan primacy. Innocent had only confirmed the suffragans and the 
primatial dignity of Toledo with Sacrosancta romana ecclesia on 4 March 1210, but it 
79 Ibid.
80 On Peter ii’s financial difficulties, see Thomas Bisson, Fiscal Accounts of Catalonia under the Early 
Count-Kings 1151-1213, 2 vols, Berkeley, 1984, i., p. 122; Manuel sánChez mArtínez, El naixement 
de la fiscalitat d’Estat a Catalunya (segles xii-xiv), universitat de Girona, Girona, 1994, pp. 38-43.
81 mdi, no. 453, p. 481.
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is likely that Rodrigo, confident of success, as well as confirming his existing status 
and his theoretical authority, was also determined to secure his rights to towns and 
dioceses, which he thought would soon be captured in the campaigns of Alfonso viii 
and Prince Ferdinand 82. Given the number of problems the papacy had faced during 
the previous almost seventy years concerning the Toledan primacy, it is unsurprising 
that Innocent reacted coldly to Rodrigo’s attempts. The pope confirmed that he had 
received Rodrigo’s petitions but said that he did not intend to hear them at the time 
since it was inopportune. Innocent reminded the archbishop that since Spain was 
now faced with the serious danger of the Saracen invasion, it was hardly the right 
time to sustain a scandal concerning the primacy. ‘At the set time which I appoint, I 
will judge with equity’, quoted Innocent from Psalm 74, and in so doing guaranteed 
that the churches in Spain would not be diverted from the task at hand 83. The pope, 
of course, held good to his promise and would hear all of the arguments, including 
those dramatically staged by Archbishop Rodrigo, during the Fourth Lateran Coun-
cil in November 1215 84.
In the second half of 1211, Alfonso viii, Peter ii, and al-Nāsir were all busily 
campaigning and preparing for the great conflict ahead. After the Christian loss of 
Salvatierra in September and the death of Prince Ferdinand in October, there was a 
renewed effort made by Alfonso and Archbishop Rodrigo to gain outside support for 
the campaign. The alliance with Aragon was secured, but as well as this Alfonso ap-
pealed to Philip ii of France, Rodrigo went himself to preach in the Frankish lands, 
while Alfonso’s doctor, Arnaldo, recruited knights in Gascony and Poitou 85. Towards 
the end of the year, the bishop-elect of Segovia, Gerard, was sent to Rome, carry-
ing letters from Alfonso informing Innocent of the extent of the threat 86. Innocent 
responded by sending a letter to the archbishop of Sens and his suffragans, Recepimus 
litteras, of 31 January 1212, in which he described the extent of the Saracen invasion 
and the loss of Salvatierra 87. This letter was also sent to other prelates in France and 
Provence. The pope informed them of Alfonso’ intention to undertake a military 
campaign in the octave of Pentecost (13-20 May), emphasizing that Alfonso wished 
to die rather than see harm done to the Christian people. Innocent ordered the prel-
ates to urge their subjects to give help, both in person and with goods, in return for 
82 mdi, no. 422, p.439.
83 mdi, no. 455, p. 483; Peter linehAn, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain, Oxford, 1993, p. 
328. 
84 Johannes Dominicus mAnsi (ed.), Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 31 vols, Florence, 
1759-98, 22:1071-5; Antonio GArCíA y GArCíA, El Concilio iv Lateranense y la Peninsula Ibérica, in 
IDEM, Historia del Concilio iv Lateranense de 1215, Salamanca, 2005, pp. 87-145, at pp. 94-7; Peter 
linehAn, History and the Historians, pp. 328-31.
85 Julio González, Alfonso viii, iii., no. 890, pp. 557-8; ‘Chronica latina regum Castellae’, ch. 21, p.57.
86 mdi, no. 470, p. 500.
87 mdi, no. 468, p. 497.
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a remission of all their sins. By doing so both prelates and people could merit eternal 
glory. Pilgrims coming from whatever place would also enjoy the same remission of 
sins. It should be said that although subsequent events meant that we know less of 
the identity of most of the Frankish crusaders, it is likely there was a very positive 
response to this appeal 88.
Four days later, Innocent wrote to Alfonso, first of all sending his condolences 
for the loss of Ferdinand 89. The pope then informed the king of the letters which 
he had sent to the prelates of France and Provence, and their content. But after this 
Innocent did something which he considered absolutely all important for the success 
of the Christian enterprise. He advised Alfonso that he must place his hope in God 
and humble himself before Him, since He gives His grace to the humble and re-
turns retribution to the arrogant. It was, said Innocent, through the power that God 
would give a humble Alfonso that he would magnificently triumph over those who 
hated the cross of Christ. Here, in Cum personam tuam of 4 February, we see what 
was at the heart of the thought of the pontiff. That is, that the humble are raised up 
by God. At the same time, the letter revealed the pope’s doubts and caution. The 
pope was conscious that the circumstances within Christendom were hardly such 
that a new conflict against the Saracens was definitely going to end positively. He 
advised Alfonso that since the whole world was in turmoil, it might not be the most 
opportune moment to take on the Saracens and suggested that if he could obtain 
suitable truces he should do so 90. This hardly sounds like a rallying cry on Innocent’s 
part, but his ambivalence reflected the thoughts of a man who had no experience 
of any major Christian victory, saw what he considered the sinful divisions within 
Christendom, coupled with the increasing problem of heresy, and simply could not 
afford another disaster on the scale of Hattin and Alarcos.
Aware, however, that the conflict would soon take place, and determined to 
make the maximum contribution, Innocent made a final push for peace with Quanta 
nunc necessitas, a letter of 5 April, 1212 91. This was directed to Archbishop Rodrigo 
and Archbishop Peter of Compostela. The pope commented that how a great danger 
88 Ibid. By Alfonso viii’s estimate (mdi, no. 483, p. 510) about 62000 transmontani initially came on the 
campaign. By Arnau Amalric’s calculation (‘De Francorum expeditione’, in Martin Bouquet and 
Leopold delisle (eds.), Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, 25 vols, Paris, 1869-1904, 19, 
pp. 250-1) there were 40000. Obviously these figures are greatly exaggerated, but they do indicate that 
the initial enthusiasm was great. Arnau Amalric (‘De francorum expeditione’, pp. 250-1), Lucas of Tuy 
(Chronicon Mundi, Bk. IV, c. 88, p. 328), Alfonso viii (mdi, no. 483, p. 510), the Annals of Toledo (Los 
Anales Toledanos, P. 172), and the Primera Crónica General (Ramón menéndez PidAl (ed.), Prim-
era Crónica General de España, 2 vols, Madrid, 1955, 2, p. 692, c. 1013) all indicated that the Frankish 
knights and soldiers arrived because of the indulgences granted by the pope.
89 mdi, no. 470, pp. 500-1. 
90 Ibid; and see Helmut rosCher, Papst Innocenz iii und die Kreuzzüge, Göttingen, 1969, p. 182.
91 mdi, no. 471, pp. 501-2.
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now threatened Spain was best known to them and therefore they should persuade 
the kings of Spain to serve a peace and truce. Innocent, as one might suspect, was 
mainly concerned with how Alfonso ix would behave once the campaign was under-
way and whether he would repeat the errors of the past and side with the Almohads 
against Castile. The pope ordered that if anybody, but here specifically mentioning 
Alfonso ix, should help in anyway those who hated the cross of the Lord, who, as 
the pope had now heard, not only aspired to the destruction of Spain but also to 
other lands of the faithful of Christ 92, they were to be subject to excommunication 
and their lands placed under interdict. Moreover, if there were quarrels between the 
kingdoms, or indeed other disputes (Innocent may well here also have been con-
sidering the danger of the primacy dispute), because of the immediate danger these 
were to be deferred to a more suitable time and the procurators of the contending 
parties could argue out their differences at the papal court and the pope would give 
justice. It should also be noted here that probably just a little after this, the papal 
legate in the Languedoc, Arnau Amalric, whose legation had been extended by In-
nocent to the diocese of Pamplona in June 1210, sought to persuade Sancho vii of 
Navarre, the other king who had sided with the Almohads after Alarcos, to join the 
Las Navas campaign 93. Sancho’s response was not immediate, but he did decide to 
participate and his small force was to play an important part in the battle. On the 
Muslim side, it was believed he had come under threats from Rome, and it may well 
have been that Sancho feared the consequences of not participating 94.
The last contribution of Innocent iii prior to the battle came not in more let-
ters to Spain or elsewhere but in the famous and momentously significant Supplicatio 
generalis, the call for a general procession in Rome on 16th May, the Wednesday 
after Pentecost, the time when the pope believed the campaign would begin 95. This 
procession of men and women was called for the peace of the universal church and 
the Christian people, especially so that God might be favourable in the war that was 
now supposed to be taking place between the Christians and Saracens in Spain, lest 
92 A supposed letter of al-Nāsir, threatening to wage war on the king of Aragon, but beyond that the 
pope himself, was included in the Continuatio Lambacensis (Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scripto-
res, ix, pp. 557-8: ‘Tibi autem rex Aragonum dicimus, quoniam consilio tuo et suggestione tua multa 
dampna illata sunt Sarracenis, et dicebas aliis, quod id faceres ex consilio domini Romae: quod si dili-
genter adtenderis, in perniciem christianorum non in salutem dominis Romae fecit. Nos tandem non 
cessabimus debellando terras vestras, ire usque Romam, et trademus dominum Romae contumeliis et 
miseriis’). The same or similar propaganda had evidently reached the ears of Innocent as well.
93 August PotthAst (ed.), Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno 1198 ad annum 1304, 2 vols, 
Berlin, 1874-5, i., no. 4027; Arnau Amalric, ‘De Francorum expeditione’, p. 251.
94 Ibn ‘Idārī al-Marrākuŝī, Al-Bayān al-Mugrib fī ijtisār ajbār mulūk al-Andalus wa-l-Magrib, ed. and trans. 
Antonio huiCi mirAndA, Estudio sobre la batalla de las Navas de Tolosa, in Anales del Instituto General y 
Técnico de Valencia, 1 (1916), pp. 1-196, at p. 120. On Sancho and Las Navas, see Luís Fortun Pérez, 
Sancho vii el Fuerte, Iruña, 1987, pp. 217-44.
95 mdi, no. 473, pp. 503-4.
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the Lord should give his people up to mockery and allow other nations to rule over 
them. All the people, except those with mortal enemies, were to participate. The 
women were to gather together in the morning at Santa Maria Maggiore, the clergy 
at Santi Apostoli, the laymen at Santa Anastasia. After Collects, and accompanied 
by the tolling of bells, the three groups were to process to the Lateran campus. The 
nuns, followed by the other women, minus jewels and finery, were to process behind 
the cross of Santa Maria Maggiore. The clergy, led by the monks and the regular 
canons, followed by rectors and other clerics, were to process behind the cross of 
the Fraternity. The laymen, led by the hospitalarii, were to be preceded by the cross 
of St Peter. Meanwhile, the pope, bishops, cardinals and chaplains, were to enter 
the basilica that is called the Sancta Sanctorum, from where they were to take the 
relic of the True Cross and process to the steps of the palace of the cardinal bishop 
of Albano, around which all the clergy and people were to be assembled. Innocent 
would then preach a sermon to all the people. After that, the women were to proceed 
to the basilica of Santa Croce where the cardinal priest would celebrate Mass say-
ing that prayer Omnipotens, sempiterne deus. The women were then to go home. All 
the men meanwhile were to enter the Lateran basilica, the papal party through the 
palace, the clergy through the portico, and the laymen through the burgum. Mass 
was to be celebrated and then all were to proceed to Santa Croce, the clergy leading, 
the laymen following. There they were to recite the prayer Omnipotens, sempiterne 
deus and then return to their homes. All were commanded to fast, so that nobody, 
except the infirm, should eat fish or pottage. Those who could be, were to be content 
with bread and water. The others were to drink watered wine in moderation and eat 
herbs or fruit or even vegetables. All were to give alms to the needy, so that through 
prayer, fasting and almsgiving, the compassion of the Creator would be returned to 
the Christian people 96.
Given that Innocent later called the Roman people to his presence to explain to 
them Alfonso viii’s letter and to tell them of the great victory, it seems probable that 
many of them participated in the processions 97. Here Innocent used his impressive 
liturgical skills, which he had learnt before everything else, to sacralize the crowd, to 
draw the Roman and the wider Christian community into a union with the crusaders 
who were about to fight in the Peninsula, and to unify the Christian people above 
all through the Eucharist and the Cross, so that, in combination with the saints, 
and through their spiritual purity, they could persuade God to grant them victory. 
This procession, prior to the Fifth Crusade and deeply influencing the Children’s 
Crusade, was the perfect fusion of crusade ideology and lay piety and here Innocent 
demonstrated just how he considered those who hated the Christian people were 
96 Ibid.
97 mdi, no. 488, pp. 520-1.
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to be defeated 98. For Innocent, victory did not rest on political machinations which 
would bring Christian kingdoms together in alliance through illegal marriages, nor 
did it rest with the military might of the Castilian king (as he was quick to remind 
Alfonso viii afterwards) 99. Rather it rested with the Christian people, male and fe-
male, led by their clergy, processing behind the cross, seeing the relic of the one 
True Cross, listening to the preaching of the pope, going to Mass, and praying. And 
not only with this, but also with their fasting and almsgiving. The Christians, for the 
pope, could only win if they followed the path of the cross, purified their lives and 
performed all penitential acts with humility. Then they would receive God’s mercy. 
Then they would receive the sign for which the pope and others had been waiting 100. 
And when the Christian people had indeed acted in this manner, when they lived as 
Christians should live, then, finally, they could be victorious. It was not the sword 
of man but the gladius Dei which devoured the enemies of the cross of the Lord 101.
 98 See also Gary diCkson, La genèse de la Croisade des Enfants (1212), in Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes, 
153 (1995), pp. 53-102, at p. 82; Christoph mAier, Mass, the Eucharist and the Cross: Innocent iii and the 
relocation of the Crusade, in Pope Innocent iii and his World, pp. 351-60, at pp. 352-6.
 99 mdi, no. 488, p. 521.
100 Pl, 216: 818. Most recently on apocalyptic thought and Innocent iii, see Brett WhAlen, Dominion of 
God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages, Harvard, 2009, pp. 125-48.
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